Can Bangladesh be an exception? : NPR

Michael Kugelman is director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. This article is published as part of NPR’s 2024 Year of Global Elections series.

It has happened many times across Asia, the Middle East and beyond: Millions of people — aggrieved by economic stress, repression, corruption and impunity — launch a movement that ousts their autocratic government from power.

It recently happened in Bangladesh, the world’s eighth-most-populous country. This past summer, students mobilized against what they viewed as unfair job quotas. After security forces cracked down viciously, their movement morphed into a mass anti-government campaign that culminated in the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

While people power movements upend politics, they often fail to produce lasting democratic change. Bangladesh has a chance to be an exception — but it won’t be easy.

People power’s mixed record

In February 1986, after popular protests, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos fled the Philippines and arrived in Hawaii.

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Alberto Marquez/AP

In February 1986, after popular protests, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos fled the Philippines and arrived in Hawaii.

Alberto Marquez/AP

The people power concept originated in the Philippines in 1986, when mass protests ousted dictator Ferdinand Marcos. This ushered in a long period of democracy. But in 2022, the Marcos family returned to power. Marcos’ son was elected president following a campaign that deployed revisionism and misinformation to deny his father’s repressive rule.

More recent examples have been even less successful. “Color revolutions” in Central Asia in the early 2000s didn’t eliminate the democratic deficits plaguing the region today. The Arab Spring movement in the 2010s didn’t prevent the reemergence of dictators in the Middle East and North Africa.

In South Asia, Bangladesh’s neighborhood, a pro-democracy movement in Pakistan ended military rule in 2008 — but today, Pakistan’s army remains a dominant political player. And after mass protests over economic mismanagement ousted Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in 2022, he was succeeded by an ally, Ranil Wickremesinghe, who lined his Cabinet with Rajapaksa loyalists. This year’s presidential election offers some hope: It catapulted to power Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who rejects the Rajapaksas’ rule and strongly supported the 2022 protests.

However, some Sri Lankans will worry about the democratic bona fides of his party: It was once a violent Maoist rebel group, and it unconditionally backed the government’s brutal campaign against the Tamils, Sri Lanka’s largest ethnic minority group, in the country’s two-decade civil war.

Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus heads back to Bangladesh from Paris after his country’s revolution in August. He is now the country’s interim leader.

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Luis Tato/AFP via Getty Images

No clear vision on the way forward

There are many reasons to believe Bangladesh won’t buck the trend of political change without democratic consolidation. Hasina’s ouster has left both political as well as security vacuums, giving more space to religious radicals. For example, an al-Qaida-inspired terrorist leader was released from jail in August with all charges dropped, dozens of young men marched through Dhaka in October demanding the installation of an Islamic caliphate and videos are surfacing of young Bangladeshi boys pledging jihad.

Additionally, with Hasina, who ruled for 15 consecutive years, now out of the political picture, Bangladesh’s politics have been left in a highly unsettled state. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) — the Awami League’s main rival — wants to return to power. But it was just as repressive as the Awami League when in office during parts of the 1990s and 2000s.

The army, which staged coups in Bangladesh’s early years, stayed behind the barracks during Hasina’s rule. But the country’s large political vacuum has thrust the army into a prominent political role; the army chief now comments publicly about politics. This reminds some of the period between 2006 and 2008, when the military heavily influenced a previous interim government.

Ominously, there’s no clear political vision or consensus on the way forward for a post-Hasina Bangladesh. Protest leaders were impelled by the singular goal of ousting the former dictator, with no “day after” plan. The BNP wants early elections, but others will want to hold off. Protest leaders may want more time to form a political party. The army may want time to ensure a restoration of law and order. The interim government wants to prioritize reforms — a wise move in a nation where public institutions are plagued by corruption, nepotism and overall ineffectiveness.

But long-established political parties and other vested interests may resist reforms, fearing that reforms could dismantle the system that helped them maintain power and patronage. More broadly, the absence of a clear time frame for elections and a wider political transition will heighten uncertainty and, over time, could risk further unrest. Furthermore, if the interim government does implement meaningful reforms, an eventual election could produce a government that decides to reverse them.

The interim government is in a tough spot

Ultimately, the interim government is in a tough spot: It has set sky-high public expectations with deeply ambitious plans for large-scale reforms and democratization. But if the reform process lags and if Bangladesh’s sputtering economy doesn’t improve, the public’s patience could start to wear thin for an administration that for now enjoys ample support. After all, it is unelected, and hence it lacks a public mandate.

Yet despite all this, there’s still some hope for Bangladesh’s democracy because of the emergence of powerful new political actors determined to restore it. These include the student leaders of the protests that ousted Hasina, some of whom now serve in the interim government. This administration also features respected human rights campaigners and others calling for democratic reform.

These leaders have inspired legions of Bangladeshi youth — a dominant demographic in a nation with a median age of 25 — to telegraph their commitment to advance democracy. Since Hasina’s ouster, they’ve stood guard to protect Hindu temples from extremists, directed traffic on streets abandoned by police, cleaned up damage from street clashes, returned looted cash and weaponry, and painted pro-peace murals.

The interim government is led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus, one of the country’s most prominent pro-democracy advocates. He commands deep respect from his compatriots, especially Bangladeshi youth. Examples abound — from Czechoslovakia’s Vaclav Havel to South Korea’s Kim Dae-jung — of dissidents taking power and helping consolidate democracy. One can’t rule out Yunus and student leaders forming a new party to take on Bangladesh’s dynastic and decidedly undemocratic political leaders.

Rising above the toxic politics

An injured protester is brought for treatment at Dhaka Medical College Hospital during a clash with police and protesters on Aug. 4.

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Zabed Hasnain Chowdhury/NurPhoto via Getty Images

To move the needle forward, Bangladesh’s new leaders will need to rise above the toxic politics that have contributed to the country’s authoritarian slide. But they’re at risk of getting embroiled in them instead of transcending them. Yunus was one of Hasina’s fiercest critics. Holdouts and supporters of the previous regime don’t want him in power, which could intensify the country’s bitterly polarized politics.

Meanwhile, protest leaders have said they’ll return to the streets if their political demands aren’t met. They’ve insisted the government should have no military footprint — and yet with the current political vacuum, that’s likely not in the cards. This means fresh confrontations can’t be ruled out.

Additionally, any promising efforts made by these new political actors risk getting eclipsed by the entrenchment of old problems that resurge and hamper democratization — such as renewed political engineering by the army, intensified enmity between the Awami League and the BNP, or new campaigns of violence unleashed by emboldened religious extremists.

Bangladesh Nationalist Party leaders and supporters protest in Dhaka on Nov. 8.

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Abdul Goni/AFP via Getty Images

People power’s unfinished work

People power movements often fall short because they fail to address structural impediments to democratization — like insufficient checks on repression and impunity, as well as the absence of pathways to politics for those outside the entrenched political elite. Indeed, delivering on democracy in Bangladesh is a tall order. It requires restoring law and order and bolstering human rights; ending the politics of retribution; initiating reforms that depoliticize and create more accountability in public institutions; and eventually holding free and fair elections.

For many Bangladeshis, a successful youth-led mass movement has shattered a long malaise and kindled a newfound optimism about the country’s future. Time will tell whether such sentiment is rewarded. If that optimism ends up being misplaced, Bangladesh — even post-Hasina — will be the latest reminder of democracy’s global slump, and of people power’s unfinished work.